Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corporation : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corporation :
Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Van Wagoner and Stevens.
unknown.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corporation, No. 870118.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1635
Aif W SUPREME wwMim. 
BRIEF 
VAN WAGONER & S T E V E N S 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SUITE 5 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84IM 
TELEPHONE (801) 532-1036 FILED 
APR 4 1989 
ALEXANDER H. WALKER III Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
CHRISTOPHER J . CONDIE 
MARK O. VAN WAGONER* 
LEWIS T. STEVENS* 
CRAIG W. ANDERSON 
BRENDA L. FLANDERS 
*ALSO MEMBER CALIFORNIA BAR 
April 
3rd 
19 8 9 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq. 
Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court 
322 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
re: Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp. et al. 
Appeal No. 870118 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Oral argument in the above referenced appeal is scheduled 
for Tuesday afternoon, April 11, 1989. Following the submission 
of briefs by appellants and respondent, several cases were 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court on the issue of governmental 
immunity. Counsel for respondent Provo City Corporation, 
provided the Court with four of the most recent cases in a letter 
dated March 17, 1989. 
A significant case decided after the submission of the 
briefs but not cited by Provo City, is Schultz v. Conger, 755 
P.2d 165(Utah 1988). In Schultz, the plaintiff brought suit 
against a deputy sheriff for injuries suffered when the deputy 
allegedly struck her vehicle while he was serving subpoenas for 
Salt Lake County. The sheriff's office sought to dismiss the 
complaint on the Governmental Immunity Act. The District Court 
dismissed plaintiff's case and the plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court held that under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
as it existed at the time of the claim, plaintiff was not 
required to comply with the one year notice of claim provision 
because in serving subpoenas, the sheriff was performing a non-
governmental function. The Court noted that in 1987, the 
legislature amended §63-30-11 to require the filing of a notice 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq, 
April 3, 1989 
Page No. 2 
of claim, whether the function giving rise to the claim was 
characterized as governmental or non-governmental. The Court 
noted, however, that the amendment did not apply to the 
plaintiff's claim, because the claim arose in 1984, prior to the 
date of the 1987 amendment. The decision in the Schultz case is 
relevant to Point III of Appellant's Brief and Point IB2 of 
Appellant's Reply Brief. 
In addition, the case of Jenkins v. Swann, 675 P.2d (Points 
I and II) 1145(Utah 1983), is relevant to the equitable claims of 
taking and nuisance raised in appellant's briefs. In Jenkins, 
the plaintiff brought suit seeking a judgment concerning the 
State educational system and five of the school districts 
concerning tax practices of the County and State. The Court held 
that the suit was not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act 
because the plaintiff was seeking equitable relief in the form of 
a declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court cited El Rancho 
Enterprises, in which they had held that the common law exception 
to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long 
been recognized in this jurisdiction. The Court went on to say 
that neither the passage of time nor the enactment of the 
Governmental Immunity Act has eroded that principle. In 1978, 
the statutory section authorizing the suit in El Rancho (Utah 
Code Ann. , 1953 §10-7-77) was repealed and "such claims are now 
covered exclusively by the Governmental Immunity Act. See, Laws 
of Utah, 1978, Chapter 27, §12. These amendments do not 
undermine the continued liability of a holding in the El Rancho 
that equitable claims of this nature for assessments made without 
authority of law are exempt from the notice requirements. 
Because this holding is predicated on the common law exception to 
governmental immunity for equitable claims, such claims are also 
exempt from the undertaking requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act." The court further held that the notice 
requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act did not apply in 
this case. Jenkins, at 1154. 
The aforementioned cases are submitted pursuant to Rule 
24 (J) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and copies of the 
cases are enclosed. 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq. 
April 3, 1989 
Page No. 3 
Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated 
Si*fce#ely, 
i 
Crai$ W. Anderson 
^f or VAN WAGONER & 
CWA:pm 
cc: Gary L. Gregerson 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 South 3 00 West 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603-1849 
SCHULTZ v. CONGER 
Cite as 755 iMd 165 (Utah 198S) 
Inc., 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1982); McEnroe 
v. Morgan, 106 Idaho 326, 678 P.2d 595 
(App.1984); Illingworth v. Bushong, 61 Or. 
App. 152, 656 P.2d 370 (1982), affd, 297 Or. 
675, 688 R2d 379 (1984). 
[5] Harmon did not assert or prove that 
liquidated damages were unreasonably dis-
proportionate to compensatory damages. 
Nor was there anything in the contract 
providing for how the liquidated damages 
would be computed that indicated that the 
formula would provide an unreasonable re-
sult In fact, the evidence at trial was that 
if the contract had been performed as 
agreed, YESCO would have realized a total 
of $8,340 and, under the benefit-of-the-bar-
gain rule, could have recovered the full 
contract price, less the current value of the 
sign and the time value of the payments. 
The contractual remedy of 75 percent of 
the remaining payment balance, which in 
this case was $5,446,63, is not dispropor-
tionate to the damages actually sustained. 
Indeed, this Court recognized the validity 
of this very liquidated damages provision in 
Young Electric Sign Co. v. Vetas, 564 P.2d 
758 (Utah 1977). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial 
court erred in requiring plaintiff to prove 
actual damages and hold that the liqui-
dated damages provision should have been 
applied. 
The judgment of the trial court is re-
versed and the case is remanded for entry 
of judgment in favor of YESCO for dam-
ages as provided by the liquidated damages 
provision of the contract and for attorney 
fees as provided therein. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
DURHAM, J., and BENCH, J., Court 
of Appeals concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; 
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
Utah 165 
Le Ann R. SCHULTZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Weldon CONGER, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 860181. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 3, 1988. 
Plaintiff brought suit against deputy 
sheriff for injuries she suffered when depu-
ty sheriff allegedly struck her vehicle while 
serving subpoenas for Salt Lake County. 
Deputy sheriff moved to dismiss complaint 
on ground that plaintiff had not complied 
with Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Leonard H. Russon, J., dismissed plaintiffs 
case, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that un-
der Utah Governmental Immunity Act, as 
it existed at time claim arose, plaintiff was 
not required to comply with one-year notice 
of claim provisions inasmuch as, in serving 
subpoenas, deputy sheriff was performing 
nongovernmental function. 
Order vacated, remanded. 
Counties <£*213 
Under one-year notice of claim provi-
sions contained in Utah Governmental Im-
munity Act existing at time deputy sheriff 
allegedly hit plaintiffs vehicle while serv-
ing subpoenas during course of his employ-
ment with Salt Lake County, plaintiff was 
not required to give notice of claim inas-
much as service of process was not essen-
tial government function which only 
government could perform. U.C.A.1953, 
63-30-1 to 63-30-38. 
| MY KUMMK SYSTEM/ John S. Snow, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Louis E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
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HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Le Ann R. Schultz appeals from 
an order dismissing her complaint for fail-
ure to comply with the notice provisions of 
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and -13 (1986). 
Plaintiff commenced this action against 
defendant Weldon Conger to recover dam-
ages for her personal injuries. She alleged 
that while Conger was operating a motor 
vehicle for Salt Lake County, he negligent-
ly struck the rear of her vehicle, which was 
stopped at an intersection. Salt Lake 
County has not been made a party to this 
action. Defendant moved to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground that plaintiff had 
not complied with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-13 (1986), which provides that a 
claim against a political subdivision or 
against its employee for an act occurring 
during the performance of his duties is 
barred unless notice of the claim is filed 
with the governing body of the political 
subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises. Plaintiff did not file a claim in 
accordance with this section. 
However, in support of his motion to 
dismiss, defendant submitted an affidavit 
stating that at the time of the accident, he 
was serving subpoenas in the course of his 
employment as a deputy sheriff of Salt 
Lake County. This activity is clearly non-
governmental since rule 14(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and rules 45(c) 
and 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provide that subpoenas in both crimi-
nal and civil cases may be served by any 
adult person. We held in Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), 
that the Governmental Immunity Act, sec-
tions 63-30-1 through -38, afforded immu-
nity to the state, its political subdivisions, 
and its employees only when the employee 
is engaged in an essential governmental 
function, which we defined as a function 
which only government can perform. We 
later held that the notice requirements of 
the Governmental Immunity Act contained 
in section 63-30-13 applied only to claims 
arising from the performance of a true 
governmental function and not to nongov-
ernmental functions. Cox v. Utah Mort-
gage & Loan, 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986); 
Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sanitary 
District, 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984). 
Since plaintiff is suing an employee of a 
political subdivision who was engaged in a 
nongovernmental activity, she was not re-
quired to comply with the one-year notice 
requirements of section 63-30-13 and her 
complaint should not have been dismissed 
because of her failure to do so. It should 
be noted that in 1987 the legislature 
amended section 63-30-11 to require the 
filing of a notice of a claim whether the 
function giving rise to the claim is charac-
terized as governmental or nongovern-
mental. That amendment, however, does 
not apply to the instant case where the 
claim arose in 1984. 
The order is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, 
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
Jay REKWARD, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Howard Foley Company, Travelers In-
surance Company and Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
No. 870371-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 19, 1988. 
Worker sought review of order of In-
dustrial Commission finding permanent 
partial impairment rating of 23%, ten per-
cent due to cervical injury, and discontinu-
ing temporary total disability benefits. 
The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that 
(1) medical panel's permanent partial im-
pairment rating was neither arbitrary nor 
JENKINS v. SWAN Utah 1145 
Cite at 675 PJd 1145 (Utah 1983) 
1. Injunction <s=»114(2) 
Lynn A. JENKINS, Plaintiff Party moving for injunctive relief must 
and Appellant, have standing to invoke jurisdiction of the 
Court 
Karl G. SWAN, et a t , Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 17566. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 10, 1983. 
Plaintiff brought suit seeking judg-
ment concerning aspects of educational 
system of the state and five of its school 
districts, and concerning taxing practices of 
county and state. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Saways, 
J., dismissed complaint, and plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) plaintiff lacked standing to 
challenge constitutionality of educators 
serving in State Legislature; (2) plaintiff 
lacked standing to present his claim that 
statute providing that members of boards 
of education shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor if those persons refuse or neglect 
"to enforce the use of text books adopted 
by the [Utah State Textbook] commission 
* * * " was unconstitutional; (3) plaintiff 
lacked standing to present his claim that 
statute providing that use of textbooks 
adopted by State Textbook Commission 
"shall be mandatory in all districts and 
high schools of the state" was unconstitu-
tional; (4) plaintiff had standing to demand 
refund of his 1980 property tax; (5) plain-
tiff had standing to raise his claim concern-
ing unconstitutional expenditure of public 
moneys on tax-exempt private property 
held by religious organizations; and (6) 
plaintiff was not required to comply with 
notice and undertaking requirements of 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
Wahlquist, D J., concurred and dissent-
ed by separate opinion. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
61 5?26—26 
2. Declaratory Judgment <s=»292 
Party seeking declaratory judgment 
must have standing to invoke jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
3. Declaratory Judgment <£=*1, 272 
Statutory creation of relief in form of 
declaratory judgment does not create cause 
of action or grant jurisdiction to court 
where it would not otherwise exist; declar-
atory judgment statute merely authorizes 
new form of relief, which in some cases 
will provide fuller and more adequate rem-
edy than that which existed under common 
law. 
4. Action <s=>13 
Plaintiff must be able to show that he 
has suffered some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him personal stake in 
outcome of legal dispute. 
5. Action <£*13 
It is generally insufficient for plaintiff 
to assert only general interest he shares in 
common with members of public at large. 
6. Appeal and Error <s=>19 
Supreme Court will not entertain gen-
eralized grievances that are more appropri-
ately directed to legislative and executive 
branches of state government. 
7. Action <®=13 
Despite Supreme Court's power to 
"grant standing where matters of great 
public interest and societal impact are con-
cerned," the Court will not readily relieve 
plaintiff of salutory requirement of show-
ing real and personal interest in dispute. 
8. Action <e=*13 
Plaintiff will have standing to sue if he 
is adversely affected by government ac-
tions and there is some causal relationship 
1146 Utah 675 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
between the injury to the plaintiff, the gov-
ernmental actions and the relief requested; 
if plaintiff does not have standing under 
this criterion, court will grant standing if 
there is no one who has greater interest in 
outcome of case than plaintiff, if issue is 
unlikely to be raised at all if plaintiff is 
denied standing and if issues are of suffi-
cient weight and they are not more proper-
ly addressed by other branches of govern-
ment. 
9. Constitutional Law <s=>42.3(2) 
Plaintiff lacked standing, as taxpayer 
and citizen, to challenge constitutionality of 
educators serving in State Legislature, 
where plaintiff made no claim of specific 
injury which was causally related to al-
leged illegal activity and plaintiff was not 
resident of districts which employed educa-
tors/legislators named as defendants. 
10. Constitutional Law e=>42.1(3) 
Plaintiff lacked standing to present his 
claim that statute providing that members 
of boards of education shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor if those persons refuse or 
neglect "to enforce the use of text books 
adopted by the [Utah State Textbook] com-
mission * * *" was unconstitutional, 
where plaintiff did not allege that he was 
member of local board of education and 
therefore could not contend that he was or 
was likely to be subject to prosectuion un-
der this Code section. U.C.A.1953, 
53-13-10. 
11. Constitutional Law «=*42.1(1) 
Plaintiff lacked standing to present his 
claim that statute providing that use of 
textbooks adopted by State Textbook Com-
mission "shall be mandatory in all districts 
and high schools of the state" was uncon-
stitutional, absent allegation that the man-
date adversely affected him or his children, 
except insofar as it may have inflicted 
some kind of "spiritual" discomfort caused 
by existence of statute he believed was 
unconstitutional. U.C.A.1953, 53-13-2. 
12. Officers and Public Employees <£=>119 
Statute declaring it a misdemeanor for 
a "public officer or public employee [to] 
knowingly and intentionally" violate stat-
ute did not provide plaintiff with standing 
to act as private attorney general in en-
forcement of statute. U.C.A.1953, 67-16-
12. 
13. States <s=168V2 
Plaintiff lacked standing to request 
that State Education Association be re-
strained from providing gifts, loans and 
other financial support to "educator-legisla-
tors," since appropriate parties to initiate 
any action concerning violations of govern-
ing statute were in executive and legisla-
tive branches. U.C.A.1953, 67-16-10. 
14. Taxation <s=>537 
Plaintiff had standing to demand re-
fund of his 1980 property taxes based on 
his allegation of unconstitutionality of stat-
ute pursuant to which all or part of those 
taxes were assessed. 
15. Constitutional Law <2=>42.1(7f 
Plaintiffs allegations that because of 
limited amount of property available for 
taxation and unconstitutional expenditure 
of tax dollars on religious institutions 
which had large property holdings but paid 
no property taxes he was required to pay 
increased taxes as owner of taxable private 
property gave him standing to raise his 
claim concerning unconstitutional expendi-
ture of public moneys on taxes on private 
property held by religious organizations. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-11-11. 
16. Taxation <s=>543(2) 
Plaintiff seeking declaratory judgment 
and return of his property tax was not 
required to comply with notice and under-
taking requirements of Governmental Im-
munity Act U.C.A.1953, 59-11-11, 63-30-
11. 
17. Attorney General <3=>6 
Even if tax commission had duty to 
maintain records concerning private proper-
ty which was exempt from taxation, it was 
responsibility of Attorney General to prose-
cute officers who had neglected to maintain 
records. 
JENKINS 
CIteas67SPJtd! 
Thomas S. Taylor, Provo, for plaintiff 
and appellant 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake" 
City, William Evans, Asst Atty. Gen., Ted 
Cannon, Salt Lake County Atty., Bill Thom-
as Peters, Deputy S.L. Co. Atty., Felshaw 
King, Clearfield, David L. Church and Mi-
chael T. McCoy, Bruce Findlay, Salt Lake 
City, Ron Elton, Tooele, for defendants and 
respondents. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiff/appellant, Lynn A. Jenkins (Jen-
kins), has filed this multi-party and multi-
faceted lawsuit which defies a simple and 
concise explanation. In a one division com-
plaint directed to all defendants, Jenkins 
seeks a judgment concerning certain as-
pects of the educational system of the state 
of Utah and five of its school districts, and 
concerning the taxing practices of Salt 
^Lake County and the state of Utah. Ap-
parently none of the defendants considered 
it necessary to exercise their rights under 
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to an ambiguous complaint. All the 
defendants, rather, proceeded under Rule 
12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
to ask that the entire complaint be dis-
missed for, inter alia, a lack of jurisdiction 
because Jenkins lacked standing to press 
these claims, failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, failure to com-
ply with thefUtah governmental immunity 
s tatute , U.OA., 1953, § 63-30-1 to - 3 8 / 
(1978 and Supp.1981 and Interim Supp. 
1983), and the previous adjudication of the 
issues in similar suits filed by Jenkins.1 In 
response to these motions, the district 
court dismissed Jenkins' complaint "as to 
all of the defendants" because: (1) Jenkins 
lacked standing, (2) Jenkins failed to com\ 
ply with notice and undertaking require-j 
rnents of the governmental immunity acty 
and (3) the matter was res judicata as 
"most issues" have already been decided 
by the Utah Supreme Court. On appeal, 
Jenkins asks that the district court's order 
of dismissal be reversed. 
v. SWAN Utah H 4 7 
14S (Utah 1983) 
The first set of defendants which can be 
identified in Jenkins' complaint are those 
related to the Utah educational system. 
These individual defendants can be 
matched with their respective school sys-
tems as follows: defendant Swan is a 
teacher for the Tooele School District; de-
fendants Curan and Burningham are teach-
ers for the Davis School District; defend-
ant Bishop is a teacher and defendant AlforJ 
is a principal for the Ogden School District; 
and defendant LeFevere is Director of Per-
sonnel for the Weber School District. The 
Jordan School District, the State of Utah, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction Wal-
ter D. Talbot, and the Utah Educational 
Association are also defendants. Jenkins* 
complaint prays for judgment as follows: 
1. A declaration that the local School 
Districts and the Utah Department of 
Public Instruction are prohibited from 
hiring Utah legislators during the term 
of their office or continuing such legisla-
tors as empnlyees once they become 
members of legislature. Article V, Sec-
tion 1 and Article VI, § 6 of the Utah 
State Constitution, state, respectively, (a) 
"no person charged with the exercise of 
the powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments [of the Utah govern-
ment], shall exercise any functions ap-
pertaining to either of the others," and 
(b) that "[n]o person holding any public 
office of profit or trust under authority 
. . . of this State, shall be a member of 
the legislature." 
2. A declaration that the educator-legis-
lators named as individual defendants 
are in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-16 (1953) for failing to file a conflict 
of interest disclosure statement concern-
ing monies allegedly received from the 
Utah Education Association during the 
time when the legislature is in session. 
3. A permanent restraining order pro-
hibiting the Utah Educational Associa-
tion from paying, hiring, loaning or gift-
ing educators-legislators during the term 
of their office as legislators. 
1. Jenkins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980); Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442 (1978). 
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4. A declaration that the "Utah State 
Textbook Commission" and the mandato-
ry use of textbook provisions of Utah 
law, § 53-13-2 and 53-13-10, U.C.A., 
1953, is unconstitutional, since it is in 
violation of Article X, § 9 of the Utah 
State Constitution, which states: "Nei-
ther the Legislature nor the State Board 
of Education shall have power to pre-
scribe textbooks to be used in the com-
mon schools." 
The second category of issues addressed 
in Jenkins' complaint relates to taxation 
and certain expenditures of public funds. 
It appears that Jenkins' demand for relief 
is directed to the Salt Lake County Attor-
ney, the Salt Lake County Commission, the 
Salt Lake County Treasurer, the State of 
Utah, the Utah Attorney General and the 
Utah Tax Commission. Jenkins filed a pro-
test with his 1980 property taxes, which 
were paid in the amount of $807.89. He 
prays for the following relief: 
1. A refund of his 1980 property tax. 
2. An order to Salt Lake County to pre-
pare, publish and update a list of all 
exempt taxable property, itemized by 
owner valuation and amount of tax for-
given; 
3. A declaratory judgment that the 
funding of the Uniform State Public Edu-
cation System by local property tax is 
unconstitutional as not providing for 
equal distribution of tax throughout the 
state and being a denial of equal protec-
tion. 
4. A declaratory judgment that provid-
ing public property and public services to 
religious organizations which are exempt 
from the payment of property tax is in 
violation of Article 1, § 4 of the Utah 
State Constitution, which states: "The 
State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion" and "[n]o pub-
lic money or property shall be appropriat-
ed for or applied to any religious wor-
ship, exercise or instruction or for the 
support of any ecclesiastical establish-
ment" 
I. 
[1-3] We consider first the question of 
whether Jenkins had standing to raise 
those issues concerning the service in the 
Utah Legislature of Utah educators. The 
threshold requirement that Jenkins have 
standing is equally applicable whether he 
seeks declaratory or injunctive relief. In-
junctive relief is a traditional equitable 
remedy in the appropriate cases, but as 
with other common law remedies, the mov-
ing party must have standing to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court. The same juris-
dictional standard applies to declaratory 
judgments. The statutory creation of re-
lief in the form of a declaratory judgment 
does not create a cause of action or grant 
jurisdiction to the court where it would not 
otherwise exist. The Utah Declaratory 
Judgment Statute merely authorizes a new 
form of relief, which in some cases will 
provide a fuller and more adequate remedy 
than that which existed under the common 
law. Gray v. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d 
251 (1943). 
[4-6] We have previously held that four 
requirements must be satisfied before the 
district court can proceed in an action for 
declaratory judgment: "(1) there must be a 
justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of 
the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties 
seeking relief must have a legally protecti-
ve interest in the controversy; and (4) the 
issues between the parties must be ripe for 
judicial determination." Jenkins v. Finlin-
son, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980) (citing Baird 
v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978)). See 
also Main Parking Mall v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., Utah, 531 P.2d 866 (1975); Lyon v. 
Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 228 P.2d 818 
(1951). Requirements (2) and (3) represent 
the traditional test for standing. Plaintiff 
must be able to show that he has suffered 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
him a personal stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 
(1975); Stromquist v. Cokayne, Utah, 646 
P.2d 746 (1982); Sears v. Ogden City 
Utah, 572 P.2d 1359 (1977); Main Parking 
Mall. It is generally insufficient for a 
JENKINS v. SWAN 
Cite as 675 FOd 1145 (Utah 1983) 
Utah H49 
plaintiff to assert only a general interest he 
shares in common with members of the 
public at large. See Stromquist; Baird v. 
State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713 (1978). We will 
not entertain generalized grievances that 
are more appropriately directed to the leg-
islative and executive branches of the state 
government. 
f Unlike the federal system, the judicial 
power of the state of Utah is not constitu-
tionally restricted by the language of Arti-
cle HI of the United States Constitution 
requiring "cases" and "controversies," 
since no similar requirement exists in the 
Utah Constitution. We previously have 
held that "this Court may grant standing 
where matters of great public interest and 
societal impact are concerned." Jenkins v. 
State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (foot-
note omitted). However, the requirement 
that the plaintiff have a personal stake in 
the outcome of a legal dispute is rooted in 
the historical and constitutional role of the 
judiciary in Utah. 
Historically, the courts were an exten-
sion of the executive branch and were de-
veloped to resolve disputes between private 
parties, and between the government as a 
land owner and private parties concerning 
the use and ownership of land. With the 
advent of mercantilism, industrialization 
and urbanization, the courts became in-
creasingly concerned with disputes over 
the regulation of economic activity by pri-
vate contract, and injuries to individuals in 
their daily activities in a crowded and com-
plex society. "[T]he liability of one individ-
ual to another under the law . . . is a mat-
ter of private rights . . . Private-rights dis-
putes . . . lie at the core of the historically 
recognized judicial power." Northern 
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct 2858, 
2870-71, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) (citations 
omitted). The courts developed ways of 
identifying and categorizing particular 
grievances, techniques for the receipt of 
information, and principles for arriving at a 
resolution of these disputes. See general-
ly T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the 
Common Law (5th ed. 1956). In the 
course of this development, the judiciary 
emerged as a governmental institution dis-
tinct from the executive. The identification 
of the judiciary as one of three separate 
and equal branches of government in our 
written state Constitution must be viewed 
in light of this historical development 
Inherent in the tripartite allocation of 
governmental powers is the historical and 
pragmatic conviction that particular dis-
putes are most amenable to resolution in 
particular forums. /The requirement that a 
plaintiff have a personal stake in the out-
come of a dispute is intended to confine the 
courts to a role consistent with the separa-
tion of powers, and to limit the jurisdiction 
of the courts to those disputes which are 
most efficiently and effectively resolved 
through the judicial process. See Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20/ 
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). The courts are most 
competent in the exercise of their function 
when they have a "concrete factual context 
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the 
consequences of judicial .action." Valley 
Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct 752, 758, 70 
L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). A plaintiff with a di-
rect and personal stake in the outcome of a 
dispute will aid the court in its delibera-
tions by fully developing all the material 
factual and legal issues in an effort to 
convince the court that the relief requested 
will redress the claimed injury. 
Constitutionally, the courts have the dual 
obligation to apply statutory and common 
law principles to a particular dispute and to 
evaluate those principles against governing 
constitutional standards. The propriety of 
such action by the federal courts has been 
recognized since Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 137) 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), 
and this Court has recognized that it is the 
inherent role of the judiciary to interpret 
constitutional provisions. See Matheson v. 
Ferry, 641 P.2d 674 (1982); Jenkins v. 
State. In the proper discharge of their 
duty in this regard, the courts must neces-
sarily defer on some issues to the other 
branches of state government. For exam-
ple, the airing of generalized grievances 
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and the vindication of public rights are 
properly addressed to the legislature, a fo-
rum where freewheeling debate on broad 
issues of public policy is in order. 
To grant standing to a litigant, who 
cannot distinguish himself from all citi-
zens, would be a significant inroad on the 
representative form of government, and 
cast the courts in the role of supervising 
the coordinate branches of government. 
It would convert the, judiciary into an 
open forum for the resolution of political 
and ideological disputes about the per-
formance of government. 
Baird v. State, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 
(1978). 
An overstepping of appropriate re-
straints on judicial review of such political 
and ideological disputes is not only consti 
tutionally and historically inappropriate, 
but also unwise. Although the Utah judici-
ary is not life-tenured, the following obser-
vation is applicable: 
[RJepeated and essentially head-on con-
frontations between the life-tenured 
branch and representative branches of 
government will not, in the long run, be 
beneficial to either. The public confi-
dence essential to the former and the 
vitality critical to the latter may well 
erode if we do not exercise self-restraint 
in the utilization of our power to nega-
tive the actions of the other branches. 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
188, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 2952, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
[7, 8] Therefore, despite our recognition 
of this Court's power to "grant standing 
where matters of great public interest and 
societal impact are concerned," this Court 
will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the 
salutory requirement of showing a real and 
personal interest in the dispute. In light of 
the historical, constitutional and practical 
considerations discussed above, we engage 
in a three-step inquiry in reviewing the 
question of a plaintiffs standing to sue. 
The first step in the inquiry will be directed 
to the traditional criteria of the plaintiffs 
personal stake in the controversy. One 
who is adversely affected by governmental 
actions has standing under this criterion. 
One who is not adversely affected has no 
standing. A mere allegation of an adverse 
impact is not sufficient There must also 
be some causal relationship alleged be-
tween the injury to the plaintiff, the gov-
ernmental actions and the relief requested. 
Because standing questions are usually 
raised prior to the introduction of any evi-
dence, we will necessarily be required to 
make a judgment whether proof of such a 
causal relationship is difficult or impossible 
and whether the relief requested is sub-
stantially likely to redress the injury 
claimed. K. Davis, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 22.20 at 368-70 (1982 Supp.). If 
the plaintiff satisfies this requirement, he 
will be granted standing and no further 
inquiry is required. 
@ If the plaintiff does not have standing 
under the first step, we will then address 
the question of whether there is anyone 
who has a greater interest in the outcome 
of the case than the plaintiff. If there is 
no one, and if the issue is unlikely to be 
raised at all if the plaintiff is denied stand-
ing, this Court will grant standing. See, 
e.g., State v. Lewis, Alaska, 559 P.2d 630, 
635 (1977). When standing is predicated on 
the assertion that the issues involve "great 
public interest and societal impact," we will 
retain our practical concern that the parties 
involved have the interest necessary to ef-
fectively assist the court in developing and 
reviewing all relevant legal and factual" 
questions. (The Court will deny standing 
when a plaintiff does not satisfy the first 
requirement of the analysis and there are 
potential plaintiffs with a more direct inter-
est in the issues who can more adequately 
litigate the issues^ 
The third step in the analysis is to decide 
if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of 
sufficient public importance in and of them-
selves to grant him standing. The absence 
of a more appropriate plaintiff will not 
automatically justify granting standing to 
a particular plaintiff. This Court must still 
determine, on a case-by-case basis, that the 
issues are of sufficient weight, see Jenkins 
v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 (1980), 
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and that they are not more properly ad- reveal other potential 
dressed by the other branches of govern-
ment Constitutional and practical consid-
erations will necessarily affect our deci-
sions in cases where a plaintiff who lacks 
standing under step one nevertheless raises 
important public issues. These are matters 
to be more fully developed in the context of 
future cases. 
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[9] In this case, Jenkins claims that he 
is bringing this complaint as a resident of 
the state of Utah and as a "citizen, taxpay-
er, registered voter and parent" who is a 
member of a class of persons with a joint 
or common right against the 'defendants. 
Jenkins is a resident of Salt Lake County 
and has paid taxes to that entity. Jenkins 
is not a resident of the Tooele, Davis, Og-
den or Weber School Districts, the districts 
which employ the educators/legislators 
named as defendants in this action. Jen-
kins fails to make any allegations that he is 
a resident of the legislative districts from 
which these individuals were elected. His 
claimed personal stake in the issue of edu-
cators serving as legislators is that they 
vote on legislation which financially bene-
fits them as employees of the education 
system and that this adversely affects Jen-
kins as a taxpayer. 
Jenkins* mere reliance on his general sta-
tus as a taxpayer and citizen does nothing 
to distinguish him from any member of the 
public at large with regard to this dispute. 
His challenge is extremely broad; he at-
tacks the constitutionality of educators 
serving in the Utah legislature, but makes 
no claim of a particularized injury to him-
self by virtue of the claimed wrong. Ab-
sent some claim of specific injury which is 
causally related to the alleged illegal activi-
ty, Jenkins has not met the traditional 
standing test articulated in step one above. 
Jenkins further requests that we grant 
him standing under the rationale that he 
raises questions of great public interest 
and societal impact. We need not address 
that issue. Since Jenkins' claim for stand-
ing on this issue is predicated solely on the 
grounds of its public importance, we will 
not grant him standing when the pleadings 
plaintiffs with a 
more direct interest in this particular ques-
tion. Jenkins' interest as a resident of the 
state of Utah is certainly less direct than 
the interest of the residents of the school 
districts which employ these individuals or 
the legislative districts from which they 
were elected. We need not and do not 
decide here whether residents of those ar-
eas would have standing to bring this com-
plaint. We do find, however, that Jenkins' 
interest is less direct than the interest of 
those living in the relevant school districts 
or legislative districts. Therefore, we will 
not invoke the standing doctrine of "great 
public interest and societal impact" to con-
sider his request for standing. 
[10,11] We also hold that Jenkins lacks 
standing to present his claims that U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 53-13-2 and 53-13-10 are uncon-
stitutional. Section 53-13-10 provides that 
members of boards of education shall be 
guilty of a misdemeanor if those persons 
refuse or neglect "to enforce the use of 
textbooks adopted by the [Utah State Text-
book] commission " Jenkins does not 
allege that he is a member of a local board 
of education and therefore cannot contend 
that he is or is likely to be subject to 
prosecution under this code section. In the 
absence of any such personal adverse im-
pact, Jenkins lacks standing to raise the 
issue of the constitutionality of the statute. 
See Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Com-
mission, Utah, 624 P.2d 1138 (1981); Cava-
ness v. Cox, Utah, 598 P.2d 349 (1979). 
Section 53-13-2 states that use of the text-
books adopted by the state textbook com-
mission "shall be mandatory in all districts 
and high schools of the state." Jenkins 
fails to allege that this mandate adversely 
affects him or his children, except insofar 
as it may inflict some kind of "spiritual" 
discomfort caused by the existence of a 
statute he believes is unconstitutional. 
This Court may not issue an advisory opin-
ion on this question merely to relieve his 
discomfort. See Redwood Gym and Baird. 
Further, members of local boards of educa-
tion constitute a class of potential plaintiffs 
with a more direct interest in this question 
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than Jenkins, and, therefore, we will not 
address the question of whether Jenkins 
should be granted standing because of the 
alleged public importance of the issues in-
volved. 
[12] Jenkins also requests that this 
Court enter an order directing the "educa-
tor-legislators" to file a conflict of interest 
disclosure statement concerning money al-
legedly received from the Utah Education 
Association. U.C.A., 1953, § 67-16-12 de-
clares it a misdemeanor for a "public offi-
cer or public employee [to] knowingly and 
intentionally" violate the statute. The stat-
ute does not provide Jenkins with standing 
to act as a private attorney general in the 
enforcement of this statute. This Court 
will not presume to order these defendants 
to do that which they are already required 
to do by statute, if in fact the statute even 
applies to legislators. 
[13] Jenkins further requests this 
Court to permanently restrain the Utah 
Education Association from providing gifts, 
loans and other financial support to "educa-
tor-legislators." U.C.A., 1953, § 67-16-10 
states that "[n]o person shall induce or 
seek to induce any public officer or public 
employee to violate any of the provisions of 
this act" The appropriate parties to initi-
ate any action concerning violations of this 
statute are in the executive and legislative 
branches. Jenkins* position in this situa-
tion is identical to that of the citizenry at 
large, and therefore he lacks standing to 
pursue this cause of action. 
II. 
In the introductory portion of this opin-
ion, we outlined the relief sought by Jen-
kins in connection with payment of his 1980 
property taxes. Apparently these claims, 
as well as those discussed above, were dis-
missed by the district court on the basis 
that Jenkins lacked standing, that he failed 
to comply with the procedural require-
ments of the statutes on governmental im-
munity, and that the doctrine of res judica-
ta applied. Unlike the issues concerning 
educators in the legislature, none of the 
questions concerning taxation and expendi-
tures raised by Jenkins appear to have 
been previously addressed to the district 
court or to this Court Therefore, the doc-
trine of res judicata does not apply. Thus, 
we must review the district court's dismiss-
al on the issues of standing and the applica-
bility of the Governmental Immunity Act 
A. 
Jenkins alleges that he paid $807.89 for 
property taxes in 1980. A copy of a Salt 
Lake County tax assessment form in that 
amount is appended to his petition along 
with a letter addressed to the Salt Lake 
County Treasurer. This letter advised that 
Jenkins' taxes had be6n paid by Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan and that the pay-
ment of the tax was under protest. The 
letter is dated November 29, 1980, the date 
noted on the tax assessment forms as the 
deadline for payment of the 1980 property 
taxes. U.C.A., 1953, § 59-11-11 (Supp. 
1981) provides that when a party deems a 
levy to be unlawful, "such party may pay 
under protest such tax .. . and thereupon 
the party so paying or his legal representa-
tive may bring an action in the tax division 
of the appropriate district court against the 
officer to whom said tax or license was 
paid, or against the state, county, munici-
pality or other taxing unit on whose behalf 
the same was collected, to recover said tax 
. . . paid under protest." No particular 
form of protest is required, Murdoch v. 
Murdoch, 38 Utah 373, 113 P. 330 (1911), 
and in the absence of the creation of a tax 
court in the district in which the action is 
filed, the bringing of an action in the appro-
priate district court is deemed as being in 
compliance with § 59-11-11. See U.C.A., 
1953, §§ 59-24-1 to -9 (Supp.1981 and In-
terim Supp.1983). For purposes of our re-
view, we assume Jenkins' allegations that 
he paid his 1980 property taxes and filed 
the letter of protest appended to his peti-
tion are true. 
[14] The constitutionality or legality of 
a tax statute may be raised in an action 
that is properly filed pursuant to § 59-11-1 
in the district court. See State Tax Com-
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mission v. Wright, Utah, 596 P.2d 634 
(1979). Therefore, Jenkins clearly has 
standing to demand a refund of his 1980 
property tax based on his claim that the tax 
statute pursuant to which all or part of 
that tax was assessed is unconstitutional. 
Jenkins1 specific claim is that the system of 
uniform funding of state public education 
by local property taxes is unconstitutional. 
We hold that Jenkins has standing to de-
mand a refund of all or part of his 1980 
property taxes based on his allegation of 
the unconstitutionality of this statutory 
scheme. 
Jenkins also requests this Court to de-
clare the providing of public property and 
public services to religious organizations, 
which are exempt by law from the payment 
of property taxes, unconstitutional under 
Art. 1, Sec. 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
This Court has long held that a taxpayer 
has standing to prosecute an action against 
municipalities and other political subdivi-
sions of the state for illegal expenditures. 
In an early case involving expenditures for 
the construction of a water distribution 
system, we said: 
To* the extent that the water rates are 
excessive his taxes are increased, and the 
mere fact that it increases in like propor-
tion the taxes of all other taxpayers does 
not deprive him of the right to maintain 
an action to arrest the waste of public 
funds. 
Brummitt v. Ogden Waterworks Co., 33 
Utah 289, 295-96, 93 P. 828, 831 (1908). 
See also Tooele Building Association v. 
Tooele High School District, 43 Utah 362, 
134 P. 894 (1913). 
We have also extended the taxpayer's 
right to sue concerning illegal use of public 
monies to include an action against the 
state. In Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 434, 
228 P.2d 818 (1951), we reviewed the vari-
ous arguments for and against the grant of 
such a taxpayer right of action and con-
cluded that it should be permitted in this 
state. "[A] taxpayer should be permitted 
to enjoin the unlawful expenditure of tax 
moneys in which he has a pecuniary inter-
gal purposes." Id. at 441, 228 P.2d at 821. 
In arriving at this conclusion, we quoted 
with approval the following language of 
the Illinois Supreme Court 
We have repeatedly held that taxpayers 
may resort to a court of equity to pre-
vent the misapplication of public funds, 
and that this right is based upon the 
taxpayers' equitable ownership of such 
funds and their liability to replenish the 
public treasury for the deficiency which 
would be caused by the misappropriation. 
Id. at 443, 228 P.2d at 823 (quoting Fergus 
v. Russel, 270 111. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915)). 
[151 In applying the foregoing authori-
ties to this case, we note that Jenkins 
makes allegations concerning the limited 
amount of private property in the state of 
Utah subject to state taxation. He further 
alleges that because of the limited amount 
of property available for taxation and the 
unconstitutional expenditure of tax dollars 
on religious institutions which have large 
property holdings but pay no property tax, 
he must pay increased taxes as an owner of 
taxable private property. He has alleged 
that he is directly and adversely affected 
by this governmental action. We hold that 
these allegations give him standing under 
the test set out in Section I of this opinion. 
In arriving at this conclusion, we need not 
determine the extent of the adverse impact 
on Jenkins; we only conclude that he has 
alleged a direct adverse impact which may 
be subject to proof, and it is likely that if 
the governmental action is declared uncon-
stitutional, the adverse impact on Jenkins 
will be relieved. We hold, therefore, that 
Jenkins has standing to raise his claim con-
cerning the unconstitutional expenditure of 
public monies on tax exempt private prop-
erty held by religious organizations as part 
of his claim filed under U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 59-11-11 (Supp.1981). 
B. 
The motions of the defendants to dismiss 
Jenkins' entire complaint were granted on 
the basis that he failed to comply with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See 
est, or to prevent increased levies for ille- C U.C.A., 1953, § 63-30-1 to -38 (1978 & 
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Supp.1981 & Interim Supp.1983). We need 
only address this issue in connection with 
Jenkins' claim for the return of his proper-
ty tax under § 59-11-11 as those are the 
only causes of action concerning which we 
have found Jenkins to have standing. 
[16] The district court found that Jen-
kins had failed to comply with the notice 
and undertaking requirements of the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act Section 63-30-
vi l of that Act now provides that 
[A]ny person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity or against 
an employee shall before maintaining an 
action for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under 
color of authority, shall file a written 
notice of claim with such entity. 
^The word "injury" is defined in § 63-30-
2(6) as "death, injury to a person, damage 
to or loss of property, or any other injury 
that a person may suffer to his person, or 
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted 
by a private person or his agent" This 
definition of "injury" underscores the real 
concern of the governmental immunity act, 
namely that "a governmental entity, like 
individuals and private entities, should be 
liable for an injury inflicted by i t" Stan-
diford v. Salt Lake City Corp., Utah, 605 
P.2d 1230, 1234 (1980). See also Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982). 
\AJenkins' claim for an adjustment on his 
property taxes is neither an "injury" as 
defined in § 63-30-2(6) nor is it an "action 
under this act" Jenkins is prosecuting 
this action under a separate statutory au-
thorization, § 59-11-11, which predates the 
enactment of the Governmental Immunity 
Act and which provides a distinct and sepa-
rate basis for his claim against the govern-
ment The cause of action authorized un-
der § 59-11-11 has its own notice provision 
in the form of the requirement to pay the 
tax under protest and has its own statute 
of limitation. See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-
31. It is not governed by the notice or 
undertaking requirements in the Govern-
mental Immunity Act. 
Jenkins seeks equitable relief in the form 
of a declaratory judgment, in addition to a 
return of the property tax paid under pro-
test In El Rancho Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Murray City Corp., Utah, 565 P.2d 778, 
779 (1977), we said that the "common law 
exception to governmental immunity per? 
taining to equitable claims has long been 
recognized in this jurisdiction." We held 
that neither the passage of time nor the 
enactment of the Governmental Immunity 
Act has eroded that principle. Id. at 780. 
In 1978, the statutory section authorizing 
the suit in El Rancho, see U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 10-7-77, was repealed and such claims 
are now covered exclusively by the Govern-
mental Immunity Act See Laws of Utah, 
1978 ch. 27 § 12. These amendments do 
not undermine the continued viability of 
our holding in El Rancho that equitable 
claims of this nature for assessments made 
"without authority of law," are exempt! 
from the notice requirements. El RanchoJ 
at 780jrBecause this holding is predicated 
Jon tfie common law exception to governA 
[mental immunity for equitable claims, such! 
claims are also exempt from the undertak-
ing requirements of the Governmental Im-i 
\munity Act. ' 
[17] We also note that Jenkins has re-
quested this Court to order the Salt Lake 
County Tax Commission to create and 
maintain certain records concerning private 
property which is exempt from taxation. 
U.C.A.1953, § 59-11-2 provides that "[i]f 
on examination it is found that any officer 
. . . has neglected or refused to perform 
any duty relating to revenue, the attorney 
general must prosecute the delinquent" 
Jenkins has failed to allege any statute or 
rule which imposes upon the tax commis-
sion a duty to maintain the records in the 
manner he requests. Even if there were 
such a duty, it is the responsibility of the 
attorney general to prosecute officers who 
have neglected to maintain records. Jen-
kins may of course seek any information 
which is relevant to his property tax claims 
through normal discovery procedures. 
Any disputes concerning the availability 
and relevancy of this information or the 
inconvenience of producing it in a specific 
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form would be appropriately addressed to 
the district court pursuant to its power to 
control discovery. 
III. 
As we noted at the outset, the complaint 
in this case is complicated and confusing. 
Plaintiff has not clearly identified the spe-
cific parties to whom his allegations are 
directed. It is unfortunate that the defend-
ants did not request a clarification of the 
complaint prior to proceeding with the mo-
tion to dismiss. We have attempted to 
organize the issues presented on appeal in 
order to address them. The district court's 
order of dismissal is reversed insofar as it 
dismissed the causes of action discussed in 
part II of this opinion, and affirmed in all 
other respects. This case is remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, C.J., and OAKS, J., concur. 
WAHLQUIST, District Judge concurring 
and dissenting: 
I dissent in part. I concur in the majori-
ty opinion except in the particular referred 
to below. 
I have read the plaintiff/appellant's 
pleading and brief and have heard his argu-
ment The plaintiff is not a member of the 
bar. He appears pro se. He evidences 
considerable academic training and intellec-
tual control, but does not perform in ac-
cordance with the customs of the bar. He 
should not be rewarded with undue toler-
ance at the expense of the defendants for 
appearing pro se, nor should his communi-
cations be rejected because they are not 
ordinary in the court setting. What he is 
alleging in layman's terms is surprising, 
shocking and seems unbelievable; yet, he 
makes his allegations in sober seriousness. 
His allegations, as I understand he in-
tends them, are: there is an operating, 
grand conspiracy executed by a large seg-
ment of the executive branch of the 
government (involved in public education) 
to gain control over certain important func-
tions of the legislative branch. He has 
filed one complaint that in pseudo-legalistic 
words embraces the breadth of his allega-
tions. When studied in the context of inde-
pendent paragraphs, it appears to be the 
allegations of totally independent and unre-
lated complaints, but taken as he seems to 
intend it, it is a related allegation. He 
alleges that the vast majority of the state 
public school teachers and many of the 
administrators are members of a group 
(Utah Education Association) (hereafter 
"UEA"). They are alleged to be united in 
the promotion of their own interests and in 
the shaping of the school system in accord-
ance with their desires. The UEA alleged-
ly secures funds from the group that it 
uses to finance the election of favorable 
legislative candidates, more particularly, 
teachers and administrators. During the 
legislative term, the UEA allegedly com-
pensates the group for legislative and per-
sonal expenses, even lost wages, if any. 
He claims that the UEA makes it possible 
for the teacher/legislator to draw UEA 
benefits, teachers' salaries, and legislators' 
compensation, together with earned retire-
ment benefits under both the teachers' 
retirement program and the legislators' 
retirement program simultaneously. Fur-
thermore, all these duplicate wages and 
benefits continue, not only during the legis-
lative term, but throughout the year, be-
cause of committee and legislative hear-
ings. He also alleges that their power in 
the legislature far exceeds their number, 
because they are a highly organized, un-
registered, unrestricted lobby group with 
the power to trade votes. They have ac-
cess to the floor of the legislature, assured 
of access to all information in committee 
meetings and even in caucuses. The plain-
tiff alleges that this results in innumerable 
laws not possible but for this conspiracy. 
He alleges that the schools system is now 
primarily supported by funds provided by 
the state legislature, as opposed to the 
general intent that they be locally con-
trolled by school boards. He alleges that 
the taxing system for the support of the 
school system results in favored treatment 
for certain areas, e.g., that a property own-
er of a home located in Emery County 
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would pay only one-twentieth of the taxes 
that a resident in Salt Lake County would 
pay for equal ownership in a home. He 
further alleges that the legislature has cre-
ated a textbook commission and empow-
ered the state school superintendent to reg-
ulate not only public schools but also pri-
vate schools, so that the textbooks and 
curriculum are controlled throughout the 
state in direct conflict with the state consti-
tutional provisions that state that the legis-
lature will not censure school books. He 
apparently is also convinced that the UEA 
has formed an alliance with church groups 
through parent groups, resulting in legisla-
tion and the administration of laws to make 
property tax-exempt on the basis that it is 
worship property or charitable property 
when, in fact, it may be used to promote 
the evangelistic endeavors of the church 
groups, their mutual welfare funds and 
their general activities involving church 
schools and recreation. He alleges that it 
is impossible for a taxpayer to even dis-
cover which properties are being treated as 
tax-exempt. He alleges that there is no 
adequate remedy in the system because it 
is extremely unlikely that any member of 
the UEA would bring a suit over a dispute 
concerning legislative wages or benefits 
and even more unlikely that any school 
board or school system would do so. He 
further alleges that so long as one cannot 
identify these tax-exempt properties or de-
termine how they are treated, a general 
law suit involving them is not likely to 
reach the courts. He seems to be in agree-
ment with the late Martin Luther King, 
who attempted to bring about social 
change or constitutional rulings by forcing 
controversies into court. See Jenkins v. 
State, Utah, 585 P.2d 442 (1978); Jenkins 
v. Bishop, Utah, 589 P.2d 770 (1980); Jen-
kins v. Finlinson, Utah, 607 P.2d 289 
(1980). As a father of school children and 
a taxpayer in Salt Lake County, he presses 
for a judicial determination by paying his 
taxes under protest. 
1. It is evident the plaintiff/appellant has taken 
instruction from both Jenkins v. State, supra, 
and Jenkins v. Bishop, supra. He now aims 
directly at the issues, wants an evidentiary hear 
While the plaintiff seems to welcome ju-
dicial action on any portion of these allega-
tions, it would be illogical not to look at his 
general overall allegation for whatever 
merit it might have. It is noted that the 
same general melody of his complaint can 
be heard periodically in the news media in 
connection with legislative and school 
board elections. In view of obvious public 
interest in the matter, I would not dismiss 
it as a grandiose, paranoic delusion.1 I 
would return the case to the trial court 
with directions to hold an evidentiary hear-
ing to determine to what extent his allega-
tions may be supported by credible evi-
dence; to hear what public concerns are 
present that would indicate jurisdiction 
should not be entertained; and to direct the 
trial judge to make a discretionary finding 
as to whether this plaintiff is entitled to 
have the courts entertain jurisdiction on 
the basis that he alleges an important pub-
lic constitutional issue that is not likely to 
reach the courts by any other means and 
should be determined if the separation of 
powers are to be properly maintained. 
Such a determination would have to be 
made after paying due respect to the con-
stitutional provisions that the legislature 
will be the judge of its own election contro-
versies and that broad matters of a political 
nature are best determined in the legisla-
tive branch of government. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
HOWE, J., does not participate herein. 
WAHLQUIST, District Judge, sat. 
mg and tactfully reminds the court that in the 
past, individual justices have agreed and others 
implied that the issue is one of importance. 
